Morality Without “Free Will” : Sam Harris

We are conscious of only a tiny fraction of the information that our brains process in each moment. While we continually notice changes in our experience—in thought, mood, perception, behavior, etc.—we are utterly unaware of the neural events that produce these changes. In fact, by merely glancing at your face or listening to your tone of voice, others are often more aware of your internal states and motivations than you are. And yet most of us still feel that we are the authors of our own thoughts and actions.

The problem is that no account of causality leaves room for free will—thoughts, moods, and desires of every sort simply spring into view—and move us, or fail to move us, for reasons that are, from a subjective point of view, perfectly inscrutable. Why did I use the term “inscrutable” in the previous sentence? I must confess that I do not know. Was I free to do otherwise? What could such a claim possibly mean? Why, after all, didn’t the word “opaque” come to mind? Well, it just didn’t—and now that it vies for a place on the page, I find that I am still partial to my original choice. Am I free with respect to this preference? Am I free to feel that “opaque” is the better word, when I just do not feel that it is the better word? Am I free to change my mind? Of course not. It can only change me.

The topic of free will is one of great interest to me, so it was pleasantly surprising to discover earlier this year, while reading The Moral Landscape that Sam Harris shares my views on the subject almost perfectly.

It's important to note that I've been following him for many years now but without having heard anything about his position on this. So for his views to so tightly mesh with mine was both stunning as well as vindicating. I openly admit that I rest strongly in the realm of bias here at this point, as I don't see how both of us--me a decently smart guy who's read and thought a lot, and Sam Harris the neuroscientist with a philosophy degree from Stanford--can be wrong about this.

Or, to be more accurate, I don't see how either of our arguments can be wrong, but both of us having come to the same conclusion (with countless others as well, of course) it just seems that much more unlikely.

If you have even a passing interest in this topic, I suggest you read this blog entry of his, which is actually a restatement of his section on free will in the book.

I look forward to comments.